| Voice of Oromia |
Voice of Oromo News
The OLF: Ideological or Leadership Bankruptcy?
Published 09/07/2009 -1:00p.m.
By Messay Kebede (Ph.D.)
I am reacting to Jawar Siraj Mohammed’s article, titled “The Failed Journey of the OLF,” in which
he mercilessly dissects the inner impediments of the organization and declares it dead for all
practical purposes (see http://www.debteraw.com/). The article delivers the deep
disappointments of a committed member forced to admit that “the OLF has been damaged
beyond repair.” It argues that the present shabby state of the organization, mainly manifested
by internal divisions, originates from the lack of tangible results both in the military and political
fields, which lack reflects the incompetence and irresolution of its leadership.
While Jawar’s criticisms are both surprising and refreshing, yet they are not bold and insightful
enough to bring about new directions of thought. The main reason for this lack of boldness and
insight is that Jawar criticizes everything except the most important issue, namely, the ideological
guidance of the OLF. Nowhere does he connect the political and military failures of the
organization with the ideology that it is pursuing. Still less does he suggest that the failures
could result from the insolvency of the ideology whose core demand, we know, is the right to self-
determination, including secession.
The lack of a bold analysis of the inadequacies of the OLF leads the author to suggest solutions
that fall short of tackling the main issue. He thus wants to contain the political influence of the
Oromo Diaspora; he also appeals for a renewed faith in the cause. But because he never
questions the ideological goal, these suggestions are hardly up to the depth of the problem.
Aware of their inefficiency, but also reluctant to challenge the ideology, the author prefers to
pronounce the OLF dead in a desperate attempt to salvage the secessionist agenda by
convincing himself and others that the failures originate from the leadership, not from the
ideology. I contend that an approach focusing on ideology better explains the failures by
showing that the incompetence and irresolution of the leadership are simply products of a
crippling thinking.
The Legacy of Radicalism
To begin with, Jawar criticizes some members for weakening the organization by creating factions
while he himself could be accused of doing just that. Such a criticism would be unfair, however,
for the fact that he has given up the project of reforming the organization proves that the
criticisms are not meant to create another faction. Since he is convinced that the organization can
no longer be repaired, his intention is to awaken the Oromo to its demise.
What is definitely untenable is a critique of the leadership that stops short of challenging the
ideology. Yet, in several places, Jawar comes close to the ideological issue but only to back down
by diverting his attention to effects rather than causes. For instance, he assertively shows how
the OLF originated from the Ethiopian student movement and inherited the undemocratic and
conspiratory mindset inherent in the movement. He writes: “OLF is a foster child of the student
movement that brought the revolution; as such it shares some common organizational behaviors
and characteristics with all other organizations that came out that era, such as the EPRP, TPLF
and EPLF.” Further, he adds: “The political forces that emerged from the student movement were
led by individuals who worshiped Mao Zedong and Stalin, so they embraced such undemocratic,
rigid and control freak organizational model.”
Seeing the nauseating state of Ethiopia and Eritrea under the TPLF and EPLF, it is inconsistent to
expect that an organization born of the same root would disseminate anything other than
hatred, war, and famine. What else could worshippers of Stalin come up with but ideas
suppressing democracy and spreading national disunity? If what the TPLF and EPLF realized is
wrong for Ethiopia as well as for the ethnic groups that they claim to represent, then it is naive
to assume that their brother, that is, the OLF, would bring about a better result. What needs to
be questioned here is the culture of hatred and disunity that Stalin veiled under the morally
loaded language of self-determination up to secession.
In denouncing the undemocratic nature of the leadership, Jawar forgets that the behavior is only
part and parcel of an ideological package inherited from the radicalization of the 60s. Unless the
whole package is thrown away, there is no way of implanting a new democratic behavior. Since
the undemocratic nature of the organization is inseparable from its ideology, the inescapable
conclusion is that an ideology fomented by worshippers of Stalin cannot be good for the Oromo.
If a new organization is indeed desired, changing the people without changing the ideology will
get you nowhere.
Far from focusing on the ideological issue, Jawar dismisses it by stressing the unity of purpose
within the OLF. Speaking of the faction that argues for the democratization of Ethiopia rather
than secession, he notes that said ideological difference “was never really big enough to split the
organization,” as the support for “independent Oromia” was “a more popular position.” Why is
secession more popular than democratization? The question makes sense because what
appears obvious is actually derived from a Stalinist analysis that the author should have
denounced.
Armed Struggle and Secession
The truth is that the lack of democracy is closely linked with the secessionist agenda. The latter
leads to the choice of armed struggle as the only feasible method, with the consequence that the
subsequent militarization of the struggle becomes incompatible with the maintenance of
democracy. Military priorities and leaders take the upper hand over democratic concerns.
Contrary to a peaceful form of struggle, the condition of military successes becomes the sacrifices
of democracy so that it is inconsistent to want military gains and democracy at the same time.
Witness: it is the emphasis on military efficiency that progressively divested the EPLF and TPLF of
their original democratic intent. The secessionist goal is inconsistent with the complaint about the
lack of democracy for another reason. When an organization that claims to represent the largest
ethnic group opts for secession, clearly it is empowering extremists to the detriment of
moderates. So that, militarization and ideological extremism combine to make democratic
practices anything but relevant to the ongoing struggle.
Worst yet, the military option induced by the ideology of secession brought the movement under
the tutelage of the Eritrean regime. Jawar speaks of the OLF as a “hostage” and attributes many
of its faults to the intervention of the Eritrean regime. Put otherwise, the OLF has lost its
independence and has become a pawn in the Eritrean pursuit of regional hegemony. The sad
thing, Jawar admits, is that the subordination has no appreciable military gains, since Eritrea
does not neighbor Oromia and so cannot provide sanctuaries for Oromo fighters.
The subordination to a regime that has regional ambition is fraught with deep adverse
consequences. A good example is the TPLF: its support for the Eritrean struggle for
independence, in the name of military necessity, empowered a pro-Eritrean and anti-Ethiopian
leadership. As a result, not only the original goal of the movement was diverted, but also the
empowered anti-Ethiopian clique is working hard to set Tigreans against Ethiopians through
favored treatments whose outcome can only be the spread of suspicion and animosity. The price
for military victory through an abnormal alliance was thus the empowerment of a clique that does
not even represent Tigray, given that the best and long term interest of Tigray is its full
integration into a prosperous Ethiopia.
The drive for secession through military means actually intensifies internal divisions, since
together with the demise of democratic practices it raises the question of knowing which faction
will become the dominant force in independent Oromia. The more the Oromo elite aspires to
create a monoethnic state, the more its internal divisions, especially the religious ones, will stand
out. One of the positive qualities of large multiethnic countries is the propensity to diffuse
differences by displaying diversity as a normal feature of social life. By contrast, in monoethnic
countries differences are perceived as abnormal and quickly generate battling factions, as shown
by the example of Lebanon and Somalia. Jawar knows that the absence of environmental
conditions appropriate for guerrilla warfare, such as mountainous areas and helpful neighboring
countries, contributes to the dearth of military success. In the face of this formidable obstacle
one would expect that the OLF is actively seeking an alternative strategy compensating the
inappropriateness of the environment by vast alliances with other ethnic groups, some of whom
even possess the required geographical conditions. Unfortunately, the policy of dispersing the
TPLF military machine by multiplying centers of military resistance cannot be considered as it
comes up against the secessionist agenda.
Let us go further: what prevents the OLF from seeing that military struggle is not the only way to
get rid of the regime is the secessionist goal. If unity of purpose could join the Oromo with other
ethnic groups, especially the Amhara, then peaceful means of struggle would be enough to
topple the Woyanne regime. I do not see how a clique with such a narrow base could suppress
for long an overwhelming majority using the strategy of noncooperation. Let us not forget that
what brought down the imperial regime was unity, and not military means. In a word, in
undermining unity, the secessionist agenda greatly reduces the power of peaceful struggle and,
by the same token, remove a much greater prospect of generating a democratic government.
Secession and Self-Mutilation
For Jawar, independent Oromia “shall play the leading role in democratizing, stabilizing and
developing the entire East Africa.” This thought overlooks that the secession of an ethnic group
that claims to be the largest group both in terms of territory and population is a much more
complicated process than the secession of Eritrea and that it is fraught with unpredictable
consequences. The secession of Oromia is not a mere amputation; it is a major dismemberment
that adversely affects all ethnic groups in Ethiopia as well as neighboring countries. Who can
stay that the secession will result in a peaceful outcome? In light of the recent horrible carnage
caused by the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, one can confidently states that the
secession will create such a chaotic and highly explosive situation that the whole region will turn
into a battlefield.
In addition to nurturing a reckless thought, the secessionist goal induces a self-mutilating
culture. When the largest ethnic group decides to split, it is behaving as a minority group. In so
doing, it degrades itself and loses sight of what it can be. What cripples the OLF is thus the
secessionist goal: the latter limits its horizon, the means at its disposal and, therefore, its will.
Jawar begins his article by asking the Oromo to “think big”; secession, however, is to think small,
and hence to be small. Organizations grow and become efficient when they espouse challenging
goals, not when they fail to be what they can be. One should seriously reflect on the possibility
that the political and military failures of the OLF may be connected with the self-demeaning image
enshrined in the secessionist ideology.
Oromo leaders claim to uplift the Oromo people by defending secession. They are actually doing
the opposite, given that the Oromo could become the force that democratizes and consolidates
Ethiopia instead of dismembering it. The distorting impact of the secessionist ideology is such
that Oromo elites do not even recognize greatness. Take the case of Ras Gobena: though in
alliance with Menelik he created a formidable empire that even colonial powers feared, he is seen
as a sellout and secessionists as authentic Oromo.
To say that a large ethnic group curtails itself when it stoops to the level of a minority group by
opting for secession means that the discrepancy between the great potential of the Oromo
people and the narrow goal of its elite explains the failures of the OLF. Since the leadership is
not up to the potential of the people it claims to represent, like a big load led into a narrow path,
the movement naturally goes nowhere. I thus say to the Oromo elite: think big indeed, that is,
become what you can be, builder and not wrecker.
Source ethiomedia
Published 09/07/2009 -1:00p.m.
By Messay Kebede (Ph.D.)
I am reacting to Jawar Siraj Mohammed’s article, titled “The Failed Journey of the OLF,” in which
he mercilessly dissects the inner impediments of the organization and declares it dead for all
practical purposes (see http://www.debteraw.com/). The article delivers the deep
disappointments of a committed member forced to admit that “the OLF has been damaged
beyond repair.” It argues that the present shabby state of the organization, mainly manifested
by internal divisions, originates from the lack of tangible results both in the military and political
fields, which lack reflects the incompetence and irresolution of its leadership.
While Jawar’s criticisms are both surprising and refreshing, yet they are not bold and insightful
enough to bring about new directions of thought. The main reason for this lack of boldness and
insight is that Jawar criticizes everything except the most important issue, namely, the ideological
guidance of the OLF. Nowhere does he connect the political and military failures of the
organization with the ideology that it is pursuing. Still less does he suggest that the failures
could result from the insolvency of the ideology whose core demand, we know, is the right to self-
determination, including secession.
The lack of a bold analysis of the inadequacies of the OLF leads the author to suggest solutions
that fall short of tackling the main issue. He thus wants to contain the political influence of the
Oromo Diaspora; he also appeals for a renewed faith in the cause. But because he never
questions the ideological goal, these suggestions are hardly up to the depth of the problem.
Aware of their inefficiency, but also reluctant to challenge the ideology, the author prefers to
pronounce the OLF dead in a desperate attempt to salvage the secessionist agenda by
convincing himself and others that the failures originate from the leadership, not from the
ideology. I contend that an approach focusing on ideology better explains the failures by
showing that the incompetence and irresolution of the leadership are simply products of a
crippling thinking.
The Legacy of Radicalism
To begin with, Jawar criticizes some members for weakening the organization by creating factions
while he himself could be accused of doing just that. Such a criticism would be unfair, however,
for the fact that he has given up the project of reforming the organization proves that the
criticisms are not meant to create another faction. Since he is convinced that the organization can
no longer be repaired, his intention is to awaken the Oromo to its demise.
What is definitely untenable is a critique of the leadership that stops short of challenging the
ideology. Yet, in several places, Jawar comes close to the ideological issue but only to back down
by diverting his attention to effects rather than causes. For instance, he assertively shows how
the OLF originated from the Ethiopian student movement and inherited the undemocratic and
conspiratory mindset inherent in the movement. He writes: “OLF is a foster child of the student
movement that brought the revolution; as such it shares some common organizational behaviors
and characteristics with all other organizations that came out that era, such as the EPRP, TPLF
and EPLF.” Further, he adds: “The political forces that emerged from the student movement were
led by individuals who worshiped Mao Zedong and Stalin, so they embraced such undemocratic,
rigid and control freak organizational model.”
Seeing the nauseating state of Ethiopia and Eritrea under the TPLF and EPLF, it is inconsistent to
expect that an organization born of the same root would disseminate anything other than
hatred, war, and famine. What else could worshippers of Stalin come up with but ideas
suppressing democracy and spreading national disunity? If what the TPLF and EPLF realized is
wrong for Ethiopia as well as for the ethnic groups that they claim to represent, then it is naive
to assume that their brother, that is, the OLF, would bring about a better result. What needs to
be questioned here is the culture of hatred and disunity that Stalin veiled under the morally
loaded language of self-determination up to secession.
In denouncing the undemocratic nature of the leadership, Jawar forgets that the behavior is only
part and parcel of an ideological package inherited from the radicalization of the 60s. Unless the
whole package is thrown away, there is no way of implanting a new democratic behavior. Since
the undemocratic nature of the organization is inseparable from its ideology, the inescapable
conclusion is that an ideology fomented by worshippers of Stalin cannot be good for the Oromo.
If a new organization is indeed desired, changing the people without changing the ideology will
get you nowhere.
Far from focusing on the ideological issue, Jawar dismisses it by stressing the unity of purpose
within the OLF. Speaking of the faction that argues for the democratization of Ethiopia rather
than secession, he notes that said ideological difference “was never really big enough to split the
organization,” as the support for “independent Oromia” was “a more popular position.” Why is
secession more popular than democratization? The question makes sense because what
appears obvious is actually derived from a Stalinist analysis that the author should have
denounced.
Armed Struggle and Secession
The truth is that the lack of democracy is closely linked with the secessionist agenda. The latter
leads to the choice of armed struggle as the only feasible method, with the consequence that the
subsequent militarization of the struggle becomes incompatible with the maintenance of
democracy. Military priorities and leaders take the upper hand over democratic concerns.
Contrary to a peaceful form of struggle, the condition of military successes becomes the sacrifices
of democracy so that it is inconsistent to want military gains and democracy at the same time.
Witness: it is the emphasis on military efficiency that progressively divested the EPLF and TPLF of
their original democratic intent. The secessionist goal is inconsistent with the complaint about the
lack of democracy for another reason. When an organization that claims to represent the largest
ethnic group opts for secession, clearly it is empowering extremists to the detriment of
moderates. So that, militarization and ideological extremism combine to make democratic
practices anything but relevant to the ongoing struggle.
Worst yet, the military option induced by the ideology of secession brought the movement under
the tutelage of the Eritrean regime. Jawar speaks of the OLF as a “hostage” and attributes many
of its faults to the intervention of the Eritrean regime. Put otherwise, the OLF has lost its
independence and has become a pawn in the Eritrean pursuit of regional hegemony. The sad
thing, Jawar admits, is that the subordination has no appreciable military gains, since Eritrea
does not neighbor Oromia and so cannot provide sanctuaries for Oromo fighters.
The subordination to a regime that has regional ambition is fraught with deep adverse
consequences. A good example is the TPLF: its support for the Eritrean struggle for
independence, in the name of military necessity, empowered a pro-Eritrean and anti-Ethiopian
leadership. As a result, not only the original goal of the movement was diverted, but also the
empowered anti-Ethiopian clique is working hard to set Tigreans against Ethiopians through
favored treatments whose outcome can only be the spread of suspicion and animosity. The price
for military victory through an abnormal alliance was thus the empowerment of a clique that does
not even represent Tigray, given that the best and long term interest of Tigray is its full
integration into a prosperous Ethiopia.
The drive for secession through military means actually intensifies internal divisions, since
together with the demise of democratic practices it raises the question of knowing which faction
will become the dominant force in independent Oromia. The more the Oromo elite aspires to
create a monoethnic state, the more its internal divisions, especially the religious ones, will stand
out. One of the positive qualities of large multiethnic countries is the propensity to diffuse
differences by displaying diversity as a normal feature of social life. By contrast, in monoethnic
countries differences are perceived as abnormal and quickly generate battling factions, as shown
by the example of Lebanon and Somalia. Jawar knows that the absence of environmental
conditions appropriate for guerrilla warfare, such as mountainous areas and helpful neighboring
countries, contributes to the dearth of military success. In the face of this formidable obstacle
one would expect that the OLF is actively seeking an alternative strategy compensating the
inappropriateness of the environment by vast alliances with other ethnic groups, some of whom
even possess the required geographical conditions. Unfortunately, the policy of dispersing the
TPLF military machine by multiplying centers of military resistance cannot be considered as it
comes up against the secessionist agenda.
Let us go further: what prevents the OLF from seeing that military struggle is not the only way to
get rid of the regime is the secessionist goal. If unity of purpose could join the Oromo with other
ethnic groups, especially the Amhara, then peaceful means of struggle would be enough to
topple the Woyanne regime. I do not see how a clique with such a narrow base could suppress
for long an overwhelming majority using the strategy of noncooperation. Let us not forget that
what brought down the imperial regime was unity, and not military means. In a word, in
undermining unity, the secessionist agenda greatly reduces the power of peaceful struggle and,
by the same token, remove a much greater prospect of generating a democratic government.
Secession and Self-Mutilation
For Jawar, independent Oromia “shall play the leading role in democratizing, stabilizing and
developing the entire East Africa.” This thought overlooks that the secession of an ethnic group
that claims to be the largest group both in terms of territory and population is a much more
complicated process than the secession of Eritrea and that it is fraught with unpredictable
consequences. The secession of Oromia is not a mere amputation; it is a major dismemberment
that adversely affects all ethnic groups in Ethiopia as well as neighboring countries. Who can
stay that the secession will result in a peaceful outcome? In light of the recent horrible carnage
caused by the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, one can confidently states that the
secession will create such a chaotic and highly explosive situation that the whole region will turn
into a battlefield.
In addition to nurturing a reckless thought, the secessionist goal induces a self-mutilating
culture. When the largest ethnic group decides to split, it is behaving as a minority group. In so
doing, it degrades itself and loses sight of what it can be. What cripples the OLF is thus the
secessionist goal: the latter limits its horizon, the means at its disposal and, therefore, its will.
Jawar begins his article by asking the Oromo to “think big”; secession, however, is to think small,
and hence to be small. Organizations grow and become efficient when they espouse challenging
goals, not when they fail to be what they can be. One should seriously reflect on the possibility
that the political and military failures of the OLF may be connected with the self-demeaning image
enshrined in the secessionist ideology.
Oromo leaders claim to uplift the Oromo people by defending secession. They are actually doing
the opposite, given that the Oromo could become the force that democratizes and consolidates
Ethiopia instead of dismembering it. The distorting impact of the secessionist ideology is such
that Oromo elites do not even recognize greatness. Take the case of Ras Gobena: though in
alliance with Menelik he created a formidable empire that even colonial powers feared, he is seen
as a sellout and secessionists as authentic Oromo.
To say that a large ethnic group curtails itself when it stoops to the level of a minority group by
opting for secession means that the discrepancy between the great potential of the Oromo
people and the narrow goal of its elite explains the failures of the OLF. Since the leadership is
not up to the potential of the people it claims to represent, like a big load led into a narrow path,
the movement naturally goes nowhere. I thus say to the Oromo elite: think big indeed, that is,
become what you can be, builder and not wrecker.
Source ethiomedia
Articles by Fayyis Oromia
Aug 25, 09--A New Ethiopia with Afaan Oromo as the
National Language
Aug 20, 09--The universal truth about TPLF cadres in
cyber world
Aug 12, 09--Why was it easy for Meles' regime to rule
over Ethiopians?
Aug 03, 09--Working language of our future regional
UNION/genuine Ethiopian federation should be only
English!
July 23, 09--The question to be asked by Oromos in
Atlanta Georgia!
July 18, 09--Is WAAQ-AYYOO our KA-AYYOO / is our
KA-AYYOO the WAAQ-AYYOO?
Aug 25, 09--A New Ethiopia with Afaan Oromo as the
National Language
Aug 20, 09--The universal truth about TPLF cadres in
cyber world
Aug 12, 09--Why was it easy for Meles' regime to rule
over Ethiopians?
Aug 03, 09--Working language of our future regional
UNION/genuine Ethiopian federation should be only
English!
July 23, 09--The question to be asked by Oromos in
Atlanta Georgia!
July 18, 09--Is WAAQ-AYYOO our KA-AYYOO / is our
KA-AYYOO the WAAQ-AYYOO?
| Yesterday's Oromia |
| Today's Oromia |
1 Comment so far...
By Ogina
Re.: The OLF, ideological or leadership buncraptcy
"OLF as a Trinity (one and three at a time)!!
This short essay is just presented as a clarification for Oromo foes like Ato Robele and Prof
Messay, who are nowadays delighting by “percieving” a division of the Oromo liberation
vanguard in to “three”. To their information OLF has got from the very beginning only one
Kaayoo (goal), which also at the same time can be interpreted as three Kayyos, in a pocket and
it played with the three cards based on the objective reality it is in, aka according to the “here
and now” of the situations. Even though the only one Kayyoo is self-determination, the 3
interpretations of the Kaayoo are:
- independence without a union
- referendum on the issue: independence without a union vs independence within a union
- independence within a union.
OLF permanently advocated that it fights for Oromian independence, for Oromos’ right to self-
determination and for a union of nations in the empire/region. It emphasizes one of the three
interpretations according to the condition of the time (Zeitgeist). Whenever Abyssinians become
arrogant and start to sing about the unconditional unity of their empire with supression of
Oromos’ right, it streses independence of Oromia from Abyssinian colonialism underming the
possible union. The logic behind this is, where ever there is supression, there will be a move for
separation. When reasonable politicians from different nations in the empire start to recognize
the God given right of the great Oromo nation to self-determination, it starts to play the card of
self-determination (decision per referendum either for independence within a union or for
independence without a union).
Now the one structural OLF we Oromos had seems to have been devided in to three, each of
them just taking as a goal one of the three interpretations of the Kaayyo:
- OLF1 of Ob Galaassa seems to make no compromise on independence without a union.
- OLF2 of Ob Daud has self-determination as its goal (being open for both independence within a
union and independence without a union as far as Oromo people decide for one of the two).
- OLF3 of Ob Hassan (the new) seems to have decided for the independence within a union of
nations in the empire/region so that it sympathizes with and seems to seek an alliance with
Oromos in the ruling party aka OPDO and strives for an understanding from the reasonable “pro
unity” Abesha forces. Here I must say, it is not yet clear whether this group moves to the
position of OLF1 for it wants to consolidate all members of ULFO who do stress independence
without a union under one structural organization. Time will tell us, whether this group will be
either pro OPDO or pro ULFO. Or is there any association between the two (OPDO and ULFO)?
Any ways a Merdo to the foes of Oromo Liberation Movement is that the one/three OLF(s) will
never give up the struggle for the right of Oromos to self-determination till we Oromos be the
determiners of our own destiny, be it within Ethiopian union or without the union.
Other wise, let’s differentiate rhetoric from conviction! I do hear nowadays certain Oromo
politicians talking about the “fact” that Oromo people doesn’t want “secession”. I do consider
talking about Oromos wanting independence or not is a wrong generalization. One thing we
need to know as a fact is that almost all Oromo politicians (including those who do make the
above mentioned rhetoric) deep in their heart believe in the right of Oromo nation to self-
determination. This is the whole mark of Oromos and aim of our mindset (spiritual Organization)
aka OLF. This mindset, OLF has got one Kaayyoo, but also three Karaas (including three
rhetorics)
- OLF mindset in the rebel organizations has got an explicit rhetoric of self-determination and it
fights for this Kaayyoo by all meanses,
- OLF mindset in the opposition organizations has got the rhetoric of struggling for liberation in
Ethiopian context, but it covertly struggles for the Kaayyoo,
- OLF mindset in the ruling organization has got the rhetoric, which says: “we have already
achieved the liberation”, but yet it covertly pushes for the Kaayyoo.
So fellow Oromos, let’s allow the mindset move to the Kaayyoo in all the Karaas, despite the
rhetorics of some Oromos in the opposition and ruling Oromo organizations. Let our foes know
exactly, despite the different rhetorics, Oromo Liberation Movement can never be stopped till it
achieves the Kaayyo. We need to motivate our selves to do our rhetoric and our practice in the
liberation movement on the Karaa each of us did choose to come to the Kaayyo. Long live OLF as
a trinity (OLF with one Kaayyoo, but with three Karaas)!
We have to forget the current rhetoric of Oromo politicians in the ruling party and in the
opposition parties, who are doing their talk under the gun point of Weyane (they are just
denying the right of Oromo people to self-determination at gun point) and let’s strive to our END
Kayyoo, which is already determined by our mindset. I am personally against any sort of
dictatorial unity and I am a supporter of a union of free nations in the empire/region based on
free will. Any unity without Oromo public verdict will fail, take it only 1 year, about 10 years or as
long as 100 years. That is why I do advocate for a lasting solution based on free will of all
stakeholders, instead of the temporary hoyaa-hoyee of unity as a wishy-washy solution.
MEDREK seems to have chosen unconditional-unity as a precondition for the alliance, but the
unity they do strive for will surely never last long, because it is not based on self-determination
of peoples, but on pre-determination by only few e!
lites. TIBIBIR aka revived AFD, which may be forged by OLF et al must be based on a solid
ground and take self-determination rather than unconditional unity as the precondition for an
alliance!
Any ways, our foes need to know that, they can only manipulate and delay the realization of
Oromo’s right to self-determination, but they can never hinder it. Oromo’s mindset is leading us
to our Kaayyoo aka self-determination, take it how long it might be. Our foes like it or not, in
reality almost all Oromos are lead in our liberation struggle by this mindset. That is why an
International Crisis Group (ICG) put it: ” despite its organizational flaws and divisions, many
ordinary Oromos retain an almost messianic belief in the OLF as the major nationalist
organization”!"
email = ogina@yahoo.com
By Ogina
Re.: The OLF, ideological or leadership buncraptcy
"OLF as a Trinity (one and three at a time)!!
This short essay is just presented as a clarification for Oromo foes like Ato Robele and Prof
Messay, who are nowadays delighting by “percieving” a division of the Oromo liberation
vanguard in to “three”. To their information OLF has got from the very beginning only one
Kaayoo (goal), which also at the same time can be interpreted as three Kayyos, in a pocket and
it played with the three cards based on the objective reality it is in, aka according to the “here
and now” of the situations. Even though the only one Kayyoo is self-determination, the 3
interpretations of the Kaayoo are:
- independence without a union
- referendum on the issue: independence without a union vs independence within a union
- independence within a union.
OLF permanently advocated that it fights for Oromian independence, for Oromos’ right to self-
determination and for a union of nations in the empire/region. It emphasizes one of the three
interpretations according to the condition of the time (Zeitgeist). Whenever Abyssinians become
arrogant and start to sing about the unconditional unity of their empire with supression of
Oromos’ right, it streses independence of Oromia from Abyssinian colonialism underming the
possible union. The logic behind this is, where ever there is supression, there will be a move for
separation. When reasonable politicians from different nations in the empire start to recognize
the God given right of the great Oromo nation to self-determination, it starts to play the card of
self-determination (decision per referendum either for independence within a union or for
independence without a union).
Now the one structural OLF we Oromos had seems to have been devided in to three, each of
them just taking as a goal one of the three interpretations of the Kaayyo:
- OLF1 of Ob Galaassa seems to make no compromise on independence without a union.
- OLF2 of Ob Daud has self-determination as its goal (being open for both independence within a
union and independence without a union as far as Oromo people decide for one of the two).
- OLF3 of Ob Hassan (the new) seems to have decided for the independence within a union of
nations in the empire/region so that it sympathizes with and seems to seek an alliance with
Oromos in the ruling party aka OPDO and strives for an understanding from the reasonable “pro
unity” Abesha forces. Here I must say, it is not yet clear whether this group moves to the
position of OLF1 for it wants to consolidate all members of ULFO who do stress independence
without a union under one structural organization. Time will tell us, whether this group will be
either pro OPDO or pro ULFO. Or is there any association between the two (OPDO and ULFO)?
Any ways a Merdo to the foes of Oromo Liberation Movement is that the one/three OLF(s) will
never give up the struggle for the right of Oromos to self-determination till we Oromos be the
determiners of our own destiny, be it within Ethiopian union or without the union.
Other wise, let’s differentiate rhetoric from conviction! I do hear nowadays certain Oromo
politicians talking about the “fact” that Oromo people doesn’t want “secession”. I do consider
talking about Oromos wanting independence or not is a wrong generalization. One thing we
need to know as a fact is that almost all Oromo politicians (including those who do make the
above mentioned rhetoric) deep in their heart believe in the right of Oromo nation to self-
determination. This is the whole mark of Oromos and aim of our mindset (spiritual Organization)
aka OLF. This mindset, OLF has got one Kaayyoo, but also three Karaas (including three
rhetorics)
- OLF mindset in the rebel organizations has got an explicit rhetoric of self-determination and it
fights for this Kaayyoo by all meanses,
- OLF mindset in the opposition organizations has got the rhetoric of struggling for liberation in
Ethiopian context, but it covertly struggles for the Kaayyoo,
- OLF mindset in the ruling organization has got the rhetoric, which says: “we have already
achieved the liberation”, but yet it covertly pushes for the Kaayyoo.
So fellow Oromos, let’s allow the mindset move to the Kaayyoo in all the Karaas, despite the
rhetorics of some Oromos in the opposition and ruling Oromo organizations. Let our foes know
exactly, despite the different rhetorics, Oromo Liberation Movement can never be stopped till it
achieves the Kaayyo. We need to motivate our selves to do our rhetoric and our practice in the
liberation movement on the Karaa each of us did choose to come to the Kaayyo. Long live OLF as
a trinity (OLF with one Kaayyoo, but with three Karaas)!
We have to forget the current rhetoric of Oromo politicians in the ruling party and in the
opposition parties, who are doing their talk under the gun point of Weyane (they are just
denying the right of Oromo people to self-determination at gun point) and let’s strive to our END
Kayyoo, which is already determined by our mindset. I am personally against any sort of
dictatorial unity and I am a supporter of a union of free nations in the empire/region based on
free will. Any unity without Oromo public verdict will fail, take it only 1 year, about 10 years or as
long as 100 years. That is why I do advocate for a lasting solution based on free will of all
stakeholders, instead of the temporary hoyaa-hoyee of unity as a wishy-washy solution.
MEDREK seems to have chosen unconditional-unity as a precondition for the alliance, but the
unity they do strive for will surely never last long, because it is not based on self-determination
of peoples, but on pre-determination by only few e!
lites. TIBIBIR aka revived AFD, which may be forged by OLF et al must be based on a solid
ground and take self-determination rather than unconditional unity as the precondition for an
alliance!
Any ways, our foes need to know that, they can only manipulate and delay the realization of
Oromo’s right to self-determination, but they can never hinder it. Oromo’s mindset is leading us
to our Kaayyoo aka self-determination, take it how long it might be. Our foes like it or not, in
reality almost all Oromos are lead in our liberation struggle by this mindset. That is why an
International Crisis Group (ICG) put it: ” despite its organizational flaws and divisions, many
ordinary Oromos retain an almost messianic belief in the OLF as the major nationalist
organization”!"
email = ogina@yahoo.com
