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A Reply to Jawara's Reply - Messay Kebede
Published 09/25/2009 -12:00p.m.
By Messay Kebede
A Reply to Jawar’s Reply - Messay Kebede
I would like to thank Jawar Siraj Mohammed for the civility with which he engaged my article, â
€œThe OLF: Ideological or Leadership Bankruptcy? as Many Oromo responded to the article with
emotional outcries and personal attacks, thereby displaying not only their alarming deficiency in
sound arguments, but also their refusal to even discuss the issue. Some even went to the extent
of saying that the Oromo issue is none of my business, as though Oromia had already become a
foreign country. The happy contrast is that Jawar argues and wants to show that what failed the
Oromo is not the ideology but the leadership. Since his sober and argued reply denotes an
opening to dialogue, I reciprocate with an even higher longing for a rapprochement.
Jawara's arguments are as follows: (1) there is no ideological bankruptcy since the large majority
of the Oromo people supports the nationalist agenda of the OLF. (2) It is not true to say that the
OLF operates in geographical conditions that are inimical to armed insurgency. (3) The success of
the TPLF and EPLF highlights the importance of leadership. (4) The failure of the EPRP was due
less to ideology than to strategic mistakes of its leadership.
What we get from these factual arguments is that “ideology does not play much role in
determining the failure and success of an insurgency.†Jawar adds that, so long as an
insurgency is not strong enough, it cannot consider reformist options, for it is suicidal for an
organization to give up its mobilizing ideology. In other words, the Oromo nationalist or
secessionist agenda should be preserved until the movement is strong enough to reform itself.
Let me examine one by one these arguments.
Who Wants Secession?
Is it true to say that the Oromo people supports the secessionist agenda of the OLF? For that
matter, let us extend the issue and ask whether the Eritrean people has supported the
secessionist goal of the EPLF and whether the Tigrean people has agreed to the secession of
Eritrea and the fragmentation of Ethiopia along ethnic lines. If both movements led to dictatorial
regimes, is it not because the so-called popular support was actually imposed on the people they
claim to represent? True, both Eritreans and Tigreans wanted self-rule, but it is one thing to fight
against centralization and quite another to advocate secession. The latter is none other than a
resurgence of the elitism of the 60s when Western-educated Ethiopians usurped the right to
speak in the name of the people.
The only way by which Jawar can convince himself and other Ethiopians about the popular
support for secession is through the implementation of a free and fair democratic process that
begins by making serious reforms. If, after a time of power-sharing and democratic relationships,
the Oromo people still expresses the desire to secede, only then can we speak of popular
support. But all theoreticians, including ethnonationalists, know that in a truly democratic setup
secession is unlikely. Put otherwise, what Jawar presents as a fact is not yet a fact; it is an elitist
manipulation that uses past mistreatments to justify partition.
I add that if the Oromo had really wanted to separate from the rest of the country, no force on
earth could have stopped them. Then, what is Jawar’s hurry? Let democracy sets in and you
will have what you want if the grievances are still real. Incidentally, Jawar accepts that the OLF
does not own the monopoly of representing the Oromo people, since he accuses me of â
€œcategorizing all Oromos under one ideology and under one organization.†Another mishap
is when he calls my position “centrist,†even though all the books and articles I have
written on Ethiopia unravel centralization as the main reason for Ethiopia’s failure to
modernize.
Comparing Apples with Oranges
I leave out Jawar’s assumption that the OLF operates in conditions conducive for insurgency
because it cannot be decided by people who write from America. However, there remains the
issue of finding a neighboring country that provides political and military assistances, especially,
that can serve as a shelter. In his reply, Jawar completely overlooked a detrimental outcome that
he had vigorously and correctly denounced in his first article, to wit, the growing subordination of
the OLF to the Eritrean regime. Yet the ideology of secession which, of course, leads to the
choice of armed struggle, is responsible for the subordination.
Once it is said that the OLF has appropriate geographical conditions, the question is why it is still
failing. Jawar’s answer is unequivocal: the severe shortcomings of the leadership. He uses a
comparative approach to prove his point, namely, the military success of the TPLF and EPLF
against the Derg. Unfortunately, the comparison is defective from various angels. One cannot
compare the secession of Eritrea with that of Oromia. Not only different historical and
geographical reasons intervene, but also minority groups, as was the case with Eritrea, have
often no other option that the threat of secession.
When it comes to Oromia, we are presented with the unheard case of a group that wants to
secede, even though it claims to be the largest ethnic group of the country. It is the unfeasibility
of the case that derives me to speak of ideological bankruptcy. In the records of history, majority
groups have defended the nation so that secession has always been the ideology of
overpowered peoples. That is why I spoke of “self-mutilation†in that a group is degraded
into thinking and acting like a desperate minority group. The Oromo need an ideology that is
commensurate with their potential. Only then can they emerge victorious.
Who is the Winner?
As to the TPLF, its success should be taken with a grain of salt in light of the fact that Tigray is
historically and culturally one of the cornerstones of Ethiopia. As such, any ideology that supports
the breakup of Ethiopia is contrary to the historical role and identity of Tigrean people. That is
why every time I hear about the victory of the TPLF’s insurgency, I cannot contain my
perplexity. If the success of the TPLF depended on the secession of Eritrea, then I do not see
where the victory is. Mengistu Haile Mariam could have also stayed in power by letting Eritrea go.
Such an outcome would have been considered, not as a victory, but as a defeat. Moreover, how
is the fragmentation of Ethiopia along ethnic lines an expression of victory? When Ethiopia is
diminished and put in a condition close to disintegration––which is the only way by which an
anti-Ethiopian Tigrean clique can dominate the country––I do not shout victory for the
Tigrean people.
In place of victory, I see defeat, as no amount of military prowess will remove the bare fact of
Ethiopia as a landlocked country. What was the main source of Ethiopia’s weakness and
isolation in the past, that is, since the control of the Red Sea by Muslim forces, is back again
thanks to the TPLF. Some years ago I posted an article in which I asked Ethiopians to let Assab
go because it would only mean continuous war against Eritrea. I argued that the best option is
to work toward the return of Eritrea through some form of federal arrangement. The TPLF
government is now fully experiencing the huge impediment of being landlocked. The ethnic
paradigm and victory at all costs, even by sacrificing Eritrea, combined to bring disaster and
despair on Ethiopia. In light of these monstrous costs, is “victory†really a proper term?
Ideology and the Choice of Means
I am confused by Jawar’s statement that “ideology does not determine the failure and
success of an insurgency.†How can it be so when we know that strategic choices are
dependent on ideological inspirations? The OLF and EPLF opted for guerrilla warfare because of
their secessionist ideology. Consequently, they allied with forces opposed to Ethiopia and
refused to work with Ethiopia’s progressive forces. Likewise, to associate with the EPLF, the
TPLF had to invent the ideology of Tigray as a nation and adopt ethnic references as the highest
norms of political struggle. This ideological orientation explains why it could not ally with the EPRP
and other progressive forces. Instead, it went in the direction of helping Eritrea to become
independent in exchange for military and political support. You cannot explain the TPLF’s â
€œvictory†without its alliance with, nay, its subordination to the EPLF. In short, vision
commands strategy as well as the degree of commitment.
To explain the defeat of the EPRP by the failure of its leadership is correct, provided it is added
that the leadership failed because of ideological extremism. The choice of urban guerrilla
struggle, which is believed to be the main blunder of the organization, is not separable from the
slogans demanding a people’s government and socialism. If the EPRP had focused on
democratic struggles for freedom of association and expression and for the establishment of a
national government of reconciliation, etc., it would not have embarked on the wrong path of
urban guerrilla. Contrary to Jawar’s statement, at that time, people, including the
bureaucratic elites, the peasantry, the workers, and the Amhara population, expressed
democratic demands as opposed to the socialist ideology of students and intellectuals. The EPRP
and other leftist movements fought for the control of the state in order to impose their vision on
the society. The Derg foiled the project and adopted socialism, not because it was forced to do
so by the civilian left, as some authors claim, but because socialism exactly fitted its dictatorial
interests.
The debate over the primacy of the national question over class interest in the Ethiopian student
movement is the typical ideological battle that led to the formation of the TPLF and the OLF.
According to the Stalinist vision, the liberation of the ethnic group has precedence over the
consideration of unity with other groups. The detrimental consequence of this reasoning fully
transpires in today’s Ethiopia, since the vibrant student movement in Ethiopia is now
practically dead, undermined as it is by the dividing impact of ethnic ideology. This death is a
palpable proof of how deeply ideology can be paralyzing. My message to Jawar is thus clear:
what keeps you in chains is the diatribe against Amhara, Abyssinians and the correlated
discourse on the Ethiopian colonization of the Oromo, which discourse undermines the gestation
of common goals and actions.
Here and there Jawar’s reply seems to suggest that self-determination and secession are
used for their mobilizing power rather than their intrinsic merit. He writes: “just because an
ideology makes it simple to mobilize support, it does not mean it should be adapted without
careful and rational evaluation of its short term and long term impact after liberation.†A
merely tactical purpose diminishes the mobilizing power: not only does the secessionist ideology
divide people, but also a tactical usage means that the leaders do not really believe in the
ideology they are preaching. If that is the case, weigh the for and against, and it becomes clear
that the best option is to simply drop the ideology.
But neither Jawar nor the leaders of the OLF are willing to drop the ideology. Why? Because it
would allow extremist groups to rise and marginalize the present leadership. This is the
inevitable price for cultivating and spreading for such a long time a divisive ideology. At one point
a situation is created where it becomes impossible to reverse course. All the more reason for
allying now with Ethiopia’s moderate and progressive forces, for only the engagement of the
country in the path of resolute democratization can block the rise of extremist groups.
Published 09/25/2009 -12:00p.m.
By Messay Kebede
A Reply to Jawar’s Reply - Messay Kebede
I would like to thank Jawar Siraj Mohammed for the civility with which he engaged my article, â
€œThe OLF: Ideological or Leadership Bankruptcy? as Many Oromo responded to the article with
emotional outcries and personal attacks, thereby displaying not only their alarming deficiency in
sound arguments, but also their refusal to even discuss the issue. Some even went to the extent
of saying that the Oromo issue is none of my business, as though Oromia had already become a
foreign country. The happy contrast is that Jawar argues and wants to show that what failed the
Oromo is not the ideology but the leadership. Since his sober and argued reply denotes an
opening to dialogue, I reciprocate with an even higher longing for a rapprochement.
Jawara's arguments are as follows: (1) there is no ideological bankruptcy since the large majority
of the Oromo people supports the nationalist agenda of the OLF. (2) It is not true to say that the
OLF operates in geographical conditions that are inimical to armed insurgency. (3) The success of
the TPLF and EPLF highlights the importance of leadership. (4) The failure of the EPRP was due
less to ideology than to strategic mistakes of its leadership.
What we get from these factual arguments is that “ideology does not play much role in
determining the failure and success of an insurgency.†Jawar adds that, so long as an
insurgency is not strong enough, it cannot consider reformist options, for it is suicidal for an
organization to give up its mobilizing ideology. In other words, the Oromo nationalist or
secessionist agenda should be preserved until the movement is strong enough to reform itself.
Let me examine one by one these arguments.
Who Wants Secession?
Is it true to say that the Oromo people supports the secessionist agenda of the OLF? For that
matter, let us extend the issue and ask whether the Eritrean people has supported the
secessionist goal of the EPLF and whether the Tigrean people has agreed to the secession of
Eritrea and the fragmentation of Ethiopia along ethnic lines. If both movements led to dictatorial
regimes, is it not because the so-called popular support was actually imposed on the people they
claim to represent? True, both Eritreans and Tigreans wanted self-rule, but it is one thing to fight
against centralization and quite another to advocate secession. The latter is none other than a
resurgence of the elitism of the 60s when Western-educated Ethiopians usurped the right to
speak in the name of the people.
The only way by which Jawar can convince himself and other Ethiopians about the popular
support for secession is through the implementation of a free and fair democratic process that
begins by making serious reforms. If, after a time of power-sharing and democratic relationships,
the Oromo people still expresses the desire to secede, only then can we speak of popular
support. But all theoreticians, including ethnonationalists, know that in a truly democratic setup
secession is unlikely. Put otherwise, what Jawar presents as a fact is not yet a fact; it is an elitist
manipulation that uses past mistreatments to justify partition.
I add that if the Oromo had really wanted to separate from the rest of the country, no force on
earth could have stopped them. Then, what is Jawar’s hurry? Let democracy sets in and you
will have what you want if the grievances are still real. Incidentally, Jawar accepts that the OLF
does not own the monopoly of representing the Oromo people, since he accuses me of â
€œcategorizing all Oromos under one ideology and under one organization.†Another mishap
is when he calls my position “centrist,†even though all the books and articles I have
written on Ethiopia unravel centralization as the main reason for Ethiopia’s failure to
modernize.
Comparing Apples with Oranges
I leave out Jawar’s assumption that the OLF operates in conditions conducive for insurgency
because it cannot be decided by people who write from America. However, there remains the
issue of finding a neighboring country that provides political and military assistances, especially,
that can serve as a shelter. In his reply, Jawar completely overlooked a detrimental outcome that
he had vigorously and correctly denounced in his first article, to wit, the growing subordination of
the OLF to the Eritrean regime. Yet the ideology of secession which, of course, leads to the
choice of armed struggle, is responsible for the subordination.
Once it is said that the OLF has appropriate geographical conditions, the question is why it is still
failing. Jawar’s answer is unequivocal: the severe shortcomings of the leadership. He uses a
comparative approach to prove his point, namely, the military success of the TPLF and EPLF
against the Derg. Unfortunately, the comparison is defective from various angels. One cannot
compare the secession of Eritrea with that of Oromia. Not only different historical and
geographical reasons intervene, but also minority groups, as was the case with Eritrea, have
often no other option that the threat of secession.
When it comes to Oromia, we are presented with the unheard case of a group that wants to
secede, even though it claims to be the largest ethnic group of the country. It is the unfeasibility
of the case that derives me to speak of ideological bankruptcy. In the records of history, majority
groups have defended the nation so that secession has always been the ideology of
overpowered peoples. That is why I spoke of “self-mutilation†in that a group is degraded
into thinking and acting like a desperate minority group. The Oromo need an ideology that is
commensurate with their potential. Only then can they emerge victorious.
Who is the Winner?
As to the TPLF, its success should be taken with a grain of salt in light of the fact that Tigray is
historically and culturally one of the cornerstones of Ethiopia. As such, any ideology that supports
the breakup of Ethiopia is contrary to the historical role and identity of Tigrean people. That is
why every time I hear about the victory of the TPLF’s insurgency, I cannot contain my
perplexity. If the success of the TPLF depended on the secession of Eritrea, then I do not see
where the victory is. Mengistu Haile Mariam could have also stayed in power by letting Eritrea go.
Such an outcome would have been considered, not as a victory, but as a defeat. Moreover, how
is the fragmentation of Ethiopia along ethnic lines an expression of victory? When Ethiopia is
diminished and put in a condition close to disintegration––which is the only way by which an
anti-Ethiopian Tigrean clique can dominate the country––I do not shout victory for the
Tigrean people.
In place of victory, I see defeat, as no amount of military prowess will remove the bare fact of
Ethiopia as a landlocked country. What was the main source of Ethiopia’s weakness and
isolation in the past, that is, since the control of the Red Sea by Muslim forces, is back again
thanks to the TPLF. Some years ago I posted an article in which I asked Ethiopians to let Assab
go because it would only mean continuous war against Eritrea. I argued that the best option is
to work toward the return of Eritrea through some form of federal arrangement. The TPLF
government is now fully experiencing the huge impediment of being landlocked. The ethnic
paradigm and victory at all costs, even by sacrificing Eritrea, combined to bring disaster and
despair on Ethiopia. In light of these monstrous costs, is “victory†really a proper term?
Ideology and the Choice of Means
I am confused by Jawar’s statement that “ideology does not determine the failure and
success of an insurgency.†How can it be so when we know that strategic choices are
dependent on ideological inspirations? The OLF and EPLF opted for guerrilla warfare because of
their secessionist ideology. Consequently, they allied with forces opposed to Ethiopia and
refused to work with Ethiopia’s progressive forces. Likewise, to associate with the EPLF, the
TPLF had to invent the ideology of Tigray as a nation and adopt ethnic references as the highest
norms of political struggle. This ideological orientation explains why it could not ally with the EPRP
and other progressive forces. Instead, it went in the direction of helping Eritrea to become
independent in exchange for military and political support. You cannot explain the TPLF’s â
€œvictory†without its alliance with, nay, its subordination to the EPLF. In short, vision
commands strategy as well as the degree of commitment.
To explain the defeat of the EPRP by the failure of its leadership is correct, provided it is added
that the leadership failed because of ideological extremism. The choice of urban guerrilla
struggle, which is believed to be the main blunder of the organization, is not separable from the
slogans demanding a people’s government and socialism. If the EPRP had focused on
democratic struggles for freedom of association and expression and for the establishment of a
national government of reconciliation, etc., it would not have embarked on the wrong path of
urban guerrilla. Contrary to Jawar’s statement, at that time, people, including the
bureaucratic elites, the peasantry, the workers, and the Amhara population, expressed
democratic demands as opposed to the socialist ideology of students and intellectuals. The EPRP
and other leftist movements fought for the control of the state in order to impose their vision on
the society. The Derg foiled the project and adopted socialism, not because it was forced to do
so by the civilian left, as some authors claim, but because socialism exactly fitted its dictatorial
interests.
The debate over the primacy of the national question over class interest in the Ethiopian student
movement is the typical ideological battle that led to the formation of the TPLF and the OLF.
According to the Stalinist vision, the liberation of the ethnic group has precedence over the
consideration of unity with other groups. The detrimental consequence of this reasoning fully
transpires in today’s Ethiopia, since the vibrant student movement in Ethiopia is now
practically dead, undermined as it is by the dividing impact of ethnic ideology. This death is a
palpable proof of how deeply ideology can be paralyzing. My message to Jawar is thus clear:
what keeps you in chains is the diatribe against Amhara, Abyssinians and the correlated
discourse on the Ethiopian colonization of the Oromo, which discourse undermines the gestation
of common goals and actions.
Here and there Jawar’s reply seems to suggest that self-determination and secession are
used for their mobilizing power rather than their intrinsic merit. He writes: “just because an
ideology makes it simple to mobilize support, it does not mean it should be adapted without
careful and rational evaluation of its short term and long term impact after liberation.†A
merely tactical purpose diminishes the mobilizing power: not only does the secessionist ideology
divide people, but also a tactical usage means that the leaders do not really believe in the
ideology they are preaching. If that is the case, weigh the for and against, and it becomes clear
that the best option is to simply drop the ideology.
But neither Jawar nor the leaders of the OLF are willing to drop the ideology. Why? Because it
would allow extremist groups to rise and marginalize the present leadership. This is the
inevitable price for cultivating and spreading for such a long time a divisive ideology. At one point
a situation is created where it becomes impossible to reverse course. All the more reason for
allying now with Ethiopia’s moderate and progressive forces, for only the engagement of the
country in the path of resolute democratization can block the rise of extremist groups.
Articles by Fayyis Oromia
Aug 25, 09--A New Ethiopia with Afaan Oromo as the
National Language
Aug 20, 09--The universal truth about TPLF cadres in
cyber world
Aug 12, 09--Why was it easy for Meles' regime to rule
over Ethiopians?
Aug 03, 09--Working language of our future regional
UNION/genuine Ethiopian federation should be only
English!
July 23, 09--The question to be asked by Oromos in
Atlanta Georgia!
July 18, 09--Is WAAQ-AYYOO our KA-AYYOO / is our
KA-AYYOO the WAAQ-AYYOO?
Aug 25, 09--A New Ethiopia with Afaan Oromo as the
National Language
Aug 20, 09--The universal truth about TPLF cadres in
cyber world
Aug 12, 09--Why was it easy for Meles' regime to rule
over Ethiopians?
Aug 03, 09--Working language of our future regional
UNION/genuine Ethiopian federation should be only
English!
July 23, 09--The question to be asked by Oromos in
Atlanta Georgia!
July 18, 09--Is WAAQ-AYYOO our KA-AYYOO / is our
KA-AYYOO the WAAQ-AYYOO?
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